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Abstract: In Evans, both the U.K. High Court and Court of Appeal upheld 
Howard Johnston’s right to refuse Natallie Evans access to the 
stored embryos which represented her only hope of having a child 
which was genetically her own.  In this note, I focus on claims of 
gender (in)equality in the resolution of Evans.  My argument is that 
such claims are often made all too easily, without full consideration 
of the problems of advancing them in the context of procreative 
decision-making, where men and women are inevitably differently 
situated.   I conclude that although equality arguments are not wholly 
without value in this context, they need be used with extreme care.  
And, with due caution, I set out an equality argument of my own 
which was not made in Evans.  
Keywords:  
embryos, equality, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, 
infertility treatment services, reproduction 
 
 
Evans v. Amicus Health Care [2003] E.W.H.C. 2161 (Fam.), Evans v. Amicus 




In October 2001, Natallie Evans was told that due to the presence of serious 
tumours both of her ovaries would have to be removed.  In order to preserve some 
possibility of having the child she had always wanted, she agreed for some eggs to 
be harvested from her, and for embryos created from them and the sperm of her 
partner, Howard Johnston, to be stored for future use.  Following the removal of 
her ovaries, whilst still able to carry a pregnancy normally, Ms. Evans was left 
unable to conceive spontaneously.  Consequently, use of the frozen embryos 
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stored before surgery remained her only hope of having her own genetic child.  But 
in May 2002 her relationship broke down and, in July of that year, Mr. Johnston 
wrote to their clinic requesting that their embryos be destroyed.   Ms. Evans was 
devastated.  
 
This set of facts formed the basis for a seemingly intractable dilemma, widely 
reported in the U.K. media.  Ms. Evans brought an action requesting that she 
should be allowed to use her stored embryos in order to become pregnant, a 
request opposed by Mr. Johnston.1   Her desperate desire to have her own genetic 
child was thus pitted against his clear wish not to be forced to procreate against his 
will.  This has led a number of commentators to read this case as being 
fundamentally concerned with the relative rights of men and women in reproductive 
decision-making.  As Arden L.J. notes in considering Evans: 
 
the wider issue arises whether in a world in which many people have come to accept a 
woman’s right of choice as to whether she should have a child or not the genetic father 
should have the equivalent right – a right greater than that conferred by nature.2  
 
                                                 
1
 Ms Evans’s action was joined in the High Court with that of another woman, Lorraine Hadley.  When the High 
Court found against them, Mrs Hadley dropped out of the action, leaving Ms Evans to proceed alone to the 
Court of Appeal.  For reasons of convenience, I focus here just on Ms Evans’ case.  See: Natallie Evans v. 
Amicus Healthcare Ltd, Howard Johnston, Royal United Bath Hospital NHS Trust, The Secretary of State for 
Health, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority.  Lorraine Hadley v. Midland Fertility Services, 
Wayne Hadley, the Secretary of State for Health, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority [2003] 
E.W.H.C. 2161 (Fam.), hereinafter Evans (H.C.), Natallie Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd and Others [2004] 
E.W.C.A. (Civ.) 727, hereinafter Evans (C.A.).  The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (H.F.E.A.) 
and the Secretary of State for Health were also joined to the proceedings, taking a neutral stance on the facts 
but each arguing that the terms of the Act itself precluded granting the women the relief they sought.  The 
clinics where the couples had been treated also took a neutral stance in the proceedings.  Ms Evans’ solicitors 
have recently announced that they have lodged a petition for permission to appeal to the House of Lords.  See 
http://www.alexharris.co.uk/article/Natallie_Evans_appeals_to_the_House_of_Lords_2090.asp.  
2
 Ibid., Evans (C.A.), at 89. 
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After briefly reviewing the legal issues raised by the case, I want to offer some 
more general thoughts about gender equality in reproductive decision-making and 
the way such arguments are deployed in Evans. 
 
 
THE LEGAL ISSUES 
 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (the 1990 Act) provides that 
embryos which have been created in vitro can only be used within the terms of “an 
effective consent” from each of the parties whose gametes were used to create it.3   
It further provides that such consent can be varied or revoked at any time up until 
the moment that the embryos are used.4   Mr. Johnston’s right to withdraw his 
consent therefore seemed very clear. 
 
Ms. Evans based her case on four arguments both in the High Court and, having 
failed there, in an unsuccessful appeal against that Court’s ruling.  First, she 
claimed that Mr. Johnston could not now withdraw his consent to treatment. Given 
that effective consent existed at the date of harvest and storage, she argued, it 
must be assumed to continue, as to hold otherwise would place the treating clinic 
under an intolerable burden to investigate the current state of a couple’s 
                                                 
3
 Schedule 3, para. 6(3): “An embryo the creation of which was brought about in vitro must not be used for any 
purpose unless there is an effective consent by each person whose gametes were used to bring about the 
creation of the embryo to the use for that purpose and the embryo is used in accordance with those consents.” 
4
 See Schedule 3, para 4: (1) “The terms of any consent under this Schedule may from time to time be varied, 
and the consent may be withdrawn, by notice given by the person who gave the consent to the person keeping 
the gametes or embryo to which the consent is relevant. (2) The terms of any consent to the use of an embryo 
cannot be varied, and such consent cannot be withdrawn, once the embryo has been used – (a) in providing 
treatment services, or (b) for the purposes of research.” 
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relationship.  Both courts rejected this argument, finding that if those who formerly 
sought treatment “as a joint enterprise” no longer do so, the original consent must 
be deemed inoperative as the treatment services would no longer be within the 
terms described in the consent.5  As a question of fact, Mr. Johnston and Ms. 
Evans would plainly not be united in their quest for treatment services and, 
accordingly, Mr. Johnston’s consent would not cover implantation of the embryos 
into Ms. Evans.  The Court of Appeal further noted that while “clinics can hardly be 
expected to investigate and pass judgment upon the physical, sexual, 
psychological and emotional togetherness of a couple, [it does not seem] 
unrealistic to leave to the clinic the necessity to judge whether the couple remain 
united in their pursuit of I.V.F. treatment.”6   
 
Ms. Evans’ second contention was that the process of selecting and storing of 
embryos meant that they had already been “used” in the provision of treatment 
services with the result that, under the terms of the 1990 Act, consent could no 
longer be varied or withdrawn.  Both courts also rejected this claim.  The Court of 
Appeal noted that it would be “almost absurd” to adopt a construction the effects of 
which would be to remove a person’s right to withdraw consent on the very day 
that the embryos were created.7   
 
Thirdly, Ms. Evans claimed that Mr. Johnston was estopped from withdrawing his 
consent, as she had relied on his assurances that there was no need for her to 
                                                 
5




 Evans (C.A.), supra n. 1, at para. 33, per Thorpe L.J. 
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store unfertilised eggs in addition to the embryos created from their gametes.8   
Again, this argument receives short shrift in both courts, with Arden L.J. noting 
that:  
  
A person may give up a right created by statute for his benefit only, but here the right of 
withdrawal is granted in recognition of the dignity to which each individual is entitled.  Such 
must include an individual’s right to control the use of their own genetic material.  In my 
judgment, it would be contrary to public policy for courts to enforce agreements to allow use 
of genetic material.9   
 
Finally, Ms. Evans played the strongest card in a weak hand, arguing that courts must either read the 1990 Act in such a 
way as to render it compatible with her rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 or, if that were not possible, they must issue 
a declaration of incompatibility under it.10  Again her arguments failed.11  While both the High Court and Court of Appeal 
found that Article 8, which protects privacy interests, was engaged for both Ms. Evans and Mr. Johnston, such interference 
in the private lives of the parties as permitted by Schedule 3 of the 1990 Act was necessary for the protection of the rights of 
both gamete providers and proportionate to that aim:  
 
if Ms Evans’ argument succeeded, it would amount to interference with the genetic father’s 
right to decide not to become a parent.  Motherhood could surely not be forced on Ms 
Evans and likewise fatherhood cannot be forced on Mr Johnston…12 
 
Ms Evans’ claim that she was discriminated against in the enjoyment of her 
Convention rights on the basis of her infertility likewise failed to convince any of the 
                                                 
8
 Although recollections of exactly what had been said on this matter were hazy, Wall J. found it probable that 
Ms Evans had raised the possibility of storing unfertilised eggs, and Mr Johnston had said something like: 
"[t]hey were not going to split up.  She did not need to go in for egg freezing. She should not be negative.  He 
wanted to be the father of her children".  Evans (H.C.), supra n. 1, at para. 62. 
9
 Evans (C.A.), supra n. 1, at para. 120, per Arden L.J. 
10
 Citing Articles 2, 8, 12 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
11
 The Court of Appeal refused even to hear arguments under Article 2, noting that “Ms Evans’ case is not 
about the right to life; it is about the right to bring life into being”, Evans (C.A.), supra n. 1, at para. 19.  
Arguments on the basis of Article 12 were also swiftly despatched, with the courts finding that either this Article 
was not engaged or, alternatively, that it was not breached because of the objective justification discussed with 
regard to Article 8 (see below), Evans (H.C.), supra n. 1, at para. 265. 
12
 Evans (C.A.), supra n. 1, at para. 111, per Arden L.J.   
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judges,13 although there was an interesting division of opinion in the Court of 
Appeal on this point.  Thorpe and Sedley L.J.J. followed the reasoning of the High 
Court: all women enjoy the right to self-determination once the embryo is implanted 
regardless of the chosen conception technique.  The fact that a woman has a 
disability thus does not mean that she has been discriminated against on the basis 
of her disability.   Arden L.J. adopted a slightly different approach, albeit one which 
was ultimately as unhelpful to Ms. Evans.  She suggests that our focus should be 
on the position of a fertile woman and an infertile woman in relation to the putative 
father:    
 
Seen from that perspective, there is discrimination between the position of Ms. 
Evans and that of a woman who conceives through normal sexual intercourse.  
The genetic father is allowed to withdraw his consent in I.V.F. later than he 
could do so in ordinary sexual intercourse.14   
 
Notwithstanding this prima facie finding of discrimination, Arden L.J. agreed with 
the majority that Ms. Evans could not succeed under Article 14, as the factors 
which render the material provisions proportionate under Article 8(2) will also have 
the effect of affording objective justification for the discrimination.15  Ms. Evans’ 
lack of success in this final claim meant that her action had failed on all points in 
both the High Court and Court of Appeal.    
 
                                                 
13
 Identifying Articles 3, 5, 8 and 12, Evans (H.C.), supra n. 1, at para. 267. Article 14 provides that: “[t]he 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on 
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” 
14
 Evans (C.A.), supra n. 1, at para. 11. 
15
 Ibid., at paras. 73 (Thorpe and Sedley L.JJ.) and 118 (Arden L.J.). 
Kent Academic Repository – http://kar.kent.ac.uk  
Published version available in ‘Feminist Legal Studies, 12 (3). pp. 303-316’ 
- 7 - 
 
 
In this brief commentary, I do not intend further to explore the courts’ response to 
the legal issues raised by Evans.  For Thorpe and Sedley L.J.J., this verdict was 
wholly “dependent on the resolution of the law” rather than requiring the 
“experienced discretion that seeks to achieve fairness” which is usually required of 
the family law judge.16  The wording of the 1990 Act certainly pointed strongly 
towards the conclusion they reached, although reading between the lines of the 
judgement in the Court of Appeal clearly does suggest a creative attempt to 
explore other possibilities more favourable to Ms. Evans.17 In my view, the greater 
interest of Evans for critical commentators lies not in the way in which the 1990 Act 
was applied, but rather in whether the Act itself allows for an appropriate resolution 
in such scenarios.18   Elsewhere, I have suggested that Evans may highlight some 
problems with each of the ‘twin pillars’ of ethical support for the 1990 Act: consent 
and child welfare (see Sheldon forthcoming). My interest in this note is with the 
broad ethical underpinnings of the resolution in Evans and, specifically, whether an 
appeal to the idea of gender equality plays any useful role in guiding us here.   In 
what follows, I criticise what I believe to be equally problematic and simplistic 
assertions of both gender equality and gender inequality in Evans, before going on 
to suggest that there is one specific aspect of the case which may usefully be read 
in terms of gender inequality. 
 
                                                 
16
 Ibid., at para. 1. 
17
 I differ here from the view expressed by a previous commentator for Feminist Legal Studies (Miola 2004, p. 
76) who considers that the court “clearly came to the wrong conclusion” in Evans.  In my view, the two courts 
come to the conclusion very strongly indicated by the 1990 Act.  However, see below and Sheldon 
(forthcoming) for two tentative suggestions for further arguments which might have been advanced on behalf 
of Ms Evans.  Note further the judges’ exploration of a third (which had not been raised by counsel): whether 
Mr Johnston would feel able to agree to the continued storage of the embryos, in the hope that Ms Evans 
would eventually remarry or seek treatment with another man who might become the father of any resulting 
children by virtue of the operation of s. 28 of the 1990 Act.   
18
 Mary Warnock, the philosopher responsible for developing its conceptual underpinning, has described the 
1990 Act as “ambiguous” in the light of Evans, and confessed that the Committee she chaired “did not pursue 
a case … where there is disagreement between the parties”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/2213640.stm   
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ASSERTING GENDER EQUALITY: EVANS IN THE HIGH COURT 
 
As was noted above, Ms. Evans did not base her discrimination argument on the 
differential treatment of men and women, claiming rather that she was 
discriminated against relative to an able-bodied (fertile) woman.  Nonetheless, 
assertions made in the High Court regarding a "man’s right of veto" over use of 
embryos, prompted that Court to express a view on the matter.  Wall J. is 
vehement in his denial that the 1990 Act is anything other than even-handed in its 
treatment of the sexes, in that both are accorded the same ‘right of veto’.  He 
concludes his judgement with these words:  
  
it is not difficult to reverse the dilemma.  If a man has testicular cancer and his sperm, 
preserved prior to radical surgery which renders him permanently infertile, is used to create 
embryos with his partner; and if the couple have separated before the embryos are 
transferred into the woman, nobody would suggest that she could not withdraw her consent 
to treatment and refuse to have the embryos transferred into her.  The statutory provisions, 
like Convention Rights, apply to men and women equally.19  
 
This easy ‘reversal’ suggests that forcing Mr. Johnston to father a child against his 
will is comparable to forcing Ms. Evans to carry one against hers.  In other words, 
the fact that Mr. Johnston cannot subject Ms. Evans to an unwanted and invasive 
medical procedure followed by nine months of unwanted pregnancy and the pain 
and risks of childbirth in order to create a child which he can raise is represented 
as equivalent to the fact that Ms. Evans cannot insist on making use of the 
                                                 
19
 Evans (H.C.), supra n. 1, at para. 320. 
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embryos herself with the result that Mr. Johnston has an unwanted genetic child in 
the world. 
 
Wall J. here clearly makes the error of ignoring the significance of gestation.  
Possibly a more convincing analogy (invoking only the genetic link) would be one 
that posited the separated man with testicular cancer applying to use the embryos 
with a new partner or a surrogate mother in order to have a child which is 
genetically his own.  He might tell his ex-partner that she need have nothing to do 
with the child, that he would raise it either alone or with another woman. Again, 
legally, in this situation the ex-partner is clearly within her rights to withdraw her 
consent, even though this would deny the man his one remaining chance of having 
his own genetic child.  But neither is this scenario a perfect equivalent.  Here, the 
ex-partner would have no legal relationship with (or financial liability for) the future 
child, as its birth mother would be recognised as its legal mother.20  Further, and 
more speculatively, public opinion may treat more harshly a woman who is 
prepared to allow her genetic child to be raised entirely by others.  Finally, of 
course, my scenario introduces a third party into the equation - the ex-partner 
might feel uneasy about ‘her’ embryo being implanted into another woman’s 
body.21  But in any event, what is clear is that an exact gender reversal is 
impossible.   
 
What this suggests, of course, is that Wall J. cannot be faulted for his failure to find 
a perfect reverse gender analogy for the factual scenario in Evans (though he can, 
                                                 
20
 Section 27 of the 1990 Act. 
21
 And this scenario also assumes that the significance of genetic links is equivalent for men and women, 
which is not necessarily true. 
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I think, be criticised for ever suggesting that such a reversal might be ‘easy’).   The 
more general question which is raised here is whether gender equality arguments 
are ever likely to be any use in the context of decisions regarding the use of 
reproductive technologies: are men and women always going to be so differently 
situated as to make any recourse to thoughts about gender equality pointless? 
 
 
ASSERTING GENDER INEQUALITY: EVANS IN THE MEDIA 
 
Unlike the High Court, the media’s treatment of Evans erred not on the side of 
asserting the even-handedness of the 1990 Act, rather finding it thoroughly tainted 
with gender inequality.  The aspect of Evans which seemed most to capture the 
interest of popular commentators was the balance of power between men and 
women in reproductive decision-making, with Evans represented as a case where 
a woman’s right to reproduce was pitted against a man’s right not to do so.  I have 
noted elsewhere the ease with which the popular media take unusual sets of facts 
and locate them within a broader narrative of  “long simmering gender wars”.22   
And perhaps this reading of Evans is to be expected, given how closely it dovetails 
with more familiar narratives of a woman desiring pregnancy and a man seeking to 
resist it.  But whatever the reasons, this broad understanding of Evans paved the 
way for a number of commentators to argue that Evans unfairly advantaged Mr. 
Johnson in failing to recognise Ms. Evans’ greater moral rights over the fate of their 
frozen embryos. 
 
                                                 
22
 The phrase comes from Vobejda’s (1998) report on the US ‘sperm bandit’ case of Wallis v. Smith.  See my 
discussion of the media reporting of this case, Sheldon (2001). 
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For example, the philosopher A.C. Grayling (2003), writing for the Evening 
Standard, saw Ms. Evans as a victim of an unjust law which “places control of [her] 
prospects of motherhood into the least sympathetic hands: those of [her ex-
partner]” Whilst much has been said about the rights of fathers, argues Grayling, 
“the clincher is the fact that parenthood is a more crucial matter to women … [their] 
experience of pregnancy, childbirth, the early nurture of an infant and the bonds 
that persist for a lifetime thereafter” outweigh a “father’s role [which] is nowhere so 
central, however important otherwise” (ibid.) 
 
Still more trenchant was the attack launched by broadcaster, Jenni Murray, who 
lambasted Mr. Johnston as “cruel, mean spirited and selfish” and the law as “an 
ass for stopping [Ms. Evans] from using [the] embryos” (Murray 2003). Having 
jointly embarked on the first step towards having children, argued Murray, Mr. 
Johnston had no business to change his mind at this stage:  
 
Has no one considered the relative pain these people have endured?  For a man, I.V.F. 
involves nothing more humiliating than having five minutes of fun with a dirty magazine. For 
women there’s a long course of invasive hormone treatment, an agonising surgical 
procedure to remove the eggs and in some cases, the risk of long-term illness or even 
death if the treatment goes wrong.  We’ve accepted in the case of abortion that a foetus, 
once conceived, is the woman’s responsibility.  It is her body that will carry it to term.  It is 
her body that will be invaded if she chooses to terminate.  In terms of the physical 
investment involved, I can see no difference, whether the creative process takes place in 
the womb or in the test tube …  Conception is a joint enterprise, whether both agree a child 
should result or not, and carries enduring responsibility.  The Child Support Agency sees to 
that.  Why should a technical method of conception be any different (ibid). 
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What seems to unite these commentators is a belief that the location of the 
embryos (inside or outside a woman’s body) is not relevant to the woman’s greater 
interests in, and rights over, them.23   Grayling is explicit on this point:  
 
the male contributor to the creation of frozen embryos is anyway in exactly the same moral 
situation as any man who makes a woman pregnant but later separates from her.  An 
embryo represents the beginning of a pregnancy; no moral difference is made by the 
merely geographical matter of whether it is in a womb or a refrigerator.  If a woman has the 
right to choose to bring that embryo to term when it is in her womb, she surely has the 
same right if it is currently in a fridge (2003).  
 
Is the “merely geographical” fact that the disputed embryos currently exist outside 
of the body of Ms. Evans a difference which legitimates treating her differently from 
a pregnant woman, according greater legal rights to Mr. Johnston than those 
enjoyed by the partners of pregnant women (who surely cannot insist on the 
destruction of the embryo in utero)?  This issue might perhaps be clarified by 
asking a slightly different question:  why is it that the partners of pregnant women 
have no right to a say in the outcome of their pregnancies?24  The most compelling 
argument must surely be not that women have some special interest in bearing a 
(genetic) child that men do not share, but rather that the pregnant woman must 
have control over the pregnancy because the embryo is developing within her body 
and anything done to affect it must, of necessity, be mediated through her.   
 
                                                 
23
 Though clearly this sits uneasily with Murray’s insistence on the centrality of women’s bodily involvement in 
justifying why women have special rights over embryos, ibid. 
24
 That putative fathers have no legal right to prevent their sexual partners from terminating pregnancies has 
been established in the U.K. in the cases of Paton v. B.P.A.S. [1979] Q.B. 276, C v. S  [1988] Q.B. 135, and 
Kelly v. Kelly [1997] 2 F.L.R. 828 and in the European Court of Human Rights (at least for early pregnancy) in 
Paton v. U.K. (1980) 3 E.H.R.R. 408. 
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If this is right then it is hard to be convinced by the comments of former litigant 
against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, Diane Blood, that 
“destroying their embryos must feel a little like the women are being forced to have 
an abortion against their wishes” (Blood 2003).25  Whilst the pain caused to Ms 
Evans by the proposed destruction of the embryos is apparent, the reality of this 
situation is surely very far from forced termination.26   What Grayling, Murray and 
Blood ignore is the fact that the process of creating a child has two distinct 
biological components for women (only one of which is shared by men): a genetic 
and a gestational link.   It is this unique gestational connection which justifies 
women’s typically greater control over reproduction and in Evans this is lacking. 
 
What is interesting here is that, notwithstanding their denial of the importance of 
gestation, the commentators cited seem to assume a gender inequality in 
reproduction: arguing that women should have greater rights over the fate of 
embryos, even when the embryos exist outside of the body.  But, in the absence of 
gestation, why should women enjoy such greater claims?   It might be suggested, 
following Murray, that it is the greater physical burdens for women which are 
involved in the creation of an embryo, which ground such a right.  After all, infertility 
treatment services are invasive of women’s bodies, imposing painful and 
sometimes risky procedures and have been charged with “putting all the risk and 
responsibility for reproductive failure on the shoulders of the woman” (Alto Charo 
1994, pp. 65-6). It is undoubtedly true that the procedure to obtain gametes 
undergone by Ms Evans would have been more burdensome than that undergone 
by Mr Johnston.  But neither should the pain and risks involved in egg harvesting 
                                                 
25
 For the legal resolution of Ms Blood’s struggle to make use of sperm taken from her deceased husband, see 
R v. H.F.E.A. ex p. Blood [1997] 2 All E.R. 687 (C.A.), (1997) 35 B.M.L.R. 1. 
26
 See Evans (H.C.), supra n. 1, at para. 237.   
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be overstated.  This difference alone seems to me to be an unsatisfactory basis for 
granting control over such an important event in the lives of two individuals to just 
one of them.      
 
Is it rather then the factors cited by Grayling which should ground women’s greater 
control over procreation?  Does women’s more central role in reproduction, the 
“experience of pregnancy, childbirth, the early nurture of an infant and the bonds 
that persist for a lifetime thereafter” (Grayling 2003) ground special rights to control 
procreative decisions? Grayling is surely correct in noting the existence of a range 
of sexed/gendered differences, not just in gestation but also in the typical 
arrangements of care for young children, and such differences should surely be 
relevant in allowing women control of decisions made during pregnancy.  But 
should they extend to assuming greater rights to women over embryos which exist 
ex utero?   Such a view cannot rest on the fact that women have a greater 
involvement with specific pregnancies and children (which, presumably, would 
ground greater rights only with regard to the particular pregnancies and children in 
question).  Such a view must rather rest on the belief that women generally and 
inherently have a greater interest in procreation than do men.  And that will strike 
many as deeply problematic.  
 
 
CORRECTING BIOLOGICAL INEQUALITY: AN 
ARGUMENT UNEXPLORED IN EVANS 
Kent Academic Repository – http://kar.kent.ac.uk  
Published version available in ‘Feminist Legal Studies, 12 (3). pp. 303-316’ 




The above analysis suggests that it is easy to fall foul of the mistake of making 
easy assumptions regarding both gender equality and gender inequality in the 
regulation of reproductive decision-making.  As such, the lesson to be drawn from 
this discussion of Evans may simply be one of greater caution.  But, with due 
trepidation, it does seem to me that there was one possible claim of gender 
inequality which was left unexplored in Evans.27   
 
Natallie Evans was a cancer sufferer, who wished to preserve the possibility of 
having her own genetic child in the future.  A man with testicular cancer would 
most likely be offered the option of storing sperm for future use.   This would be 
done as a means of preserving his procreative options for later life, with no need 
for prior enquiry into the stability (or existence) of a current relationship.  Of course, 
biology here dictates that it makes no clinical sense for men and women to be 
treated in a formally equal way.  Egg storage is at an early and experimental stage 
and, at the time of the hearings in Evans, had not resulted in a single successful 
pregnancy in the U.K.28  It would therefore have little meaning as a routine 
treatment.  Yet might not a woman in this situation be offered the possibility of 
saving some embryos created with donor sperm?  We are told that if Ms Evans 
had pushed either for such a possibility or for egg storage that she would have 
been refused. 
 
[B]oth egg freezing and A.I.D. would have opened up the question of the durability of her 
relationship with Mr. Johnston. [The] clinic would have been bound to enquire into why Ms 
                                                 
27
 See Sheldon (forthcoming) for a more detailed exploration of this argument. 
28
 Evans (H.C.), supra n. 1, at para. 60. 
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Evans wanted egg freezing or to use donor sperm; and, despite her personal 
circumstances, might have felt unable to provide either when Ms. Evans had a partner who 
was capable of providing the gametes to fertilise her embryos.29 
 
The request for an alternative means of storing her eggs would have been taken 
as a sign of Ms. Evans’ lack of confidence in the stability of her relationship, and 
thus would ring alarm bells for clinics who are charged by the 1990 Act to have due 
regard for “the welfare of any child who may be born as a result of treatment 
services (including the need of that child for a father).”30   As such, Wall J. finds, to 
persist in such a request might well have led to Ms. Evans being refused 
treatment.   
 
The root of the inequality here is clearly one imposed by biology and the state of 
medical science: sperm stores well, unfertilised eggs do not.  But it is not only 
biology but also the operation of the law which imposes such stringent restrictions 
on the options which were open to Ms. Evans in terms of storage of her gametes.  
Moreover, in other areas, we have not been content to preserve those aspects of 
female disadvantage which are due to biology.  Biology dictates that pregnancy 
and breast-feeding are uniquely female activities.  But law and social policy have 
attempted to ensure that certain adverse social consequences do not result from 
these biological differences by developing a regime of protection which, however 
unsuccessfully, aims to allow women to combine these activities with a life outside 
                                                 
29
 Ibid., at para. 308. 
30
 Section 13(5) of the 1990 Act.  For a critique of this application of the welfare principle, see Sheldon 
(forthcoming). 
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the home.  This analysis may not dictate a different outcome in Evans, but it could 
suggest the need to rethink the operation of s. 13(5) in such cases for the future.31   
 
 
CONCLUSION: GENDER EQUALITY IN REPRODUCTIVE DECISION-MAKING 
 
In this brief note, I have not suggested that the principle of gender equality is without use in the context of reproductive 
decision-making.  I have, however, suggested that it needs to be invoked with a great deal of caution.  What this means is 
that, if we are serious about enshrining gender justice in the regulation of reproductive medicine, we need a rather more far-
reaching enquiry of what is meant by this term than a simple appeal to equality.   
 
One final point bears making by way of conclusion.  Whatever else divided Ms. 
Evans and Mr. Johnston, they were united in a belief in the importance of genetic 
links in grounding parenthood.  Ms. Evans’ medical condition does not deny her 
the possibility of carrying a pregnancy and giving birth to a child; what is now 
excluded is the possibility of that child being genetically her own.  Likewise, Mr 
Johnston made it clear that he did not want to have a genetic child in the world 
unless he could be involved in actively parenting it.  He claimed here to be guided 
not just by the legal and financial burdens of fatherhood, but also by the 
psychological and moral ones.32   Thus, those who would criticise Mr. Johnston for 
his unwillingness to allow Ms. Evans to go ahead, given the only cost to him was to 
have an unwanted child, need to explain why his reasons for not wanting a genetic 
child are less compelling than Ms Evans’s desire for wanting a genetically related 
child rather than one conceived via donor embryo.  This raises two further 
                                                 
31
 It also suggests a clear tension in the role of clinics in similar factual situations who may find themselves, at 
the same time, advising on the most medically advantageous storage of gametes for a cancer sufferer like 
Natallie Evans, whilst simultaneously operating at gate-keepers for access to I.V.F.  On this point, see further 
Sheldon (forthcoming).    
32
 Mr Johnston told the Court of Appeal that his “clear position was one of fundamental rather than purely 
financial objection”, Evans (C.A.), supra n. 1, at para. 32. 
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interesting issues which relate to the earlier discussion of gender equality and 
which I here leave open.  Firstly, can we assume that genetic links have the same 
psychological, social and moral significance for men and for women? In other 
words, are the genetic interests cited here truly equivalent?33  And, secondly, if the 
interests of the parties are equivalent, is it right that the law should allow the 
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